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Abstract—Privacy-preserving distributed machine learning be-
comes increasingly important due to the recent rapid growth
of data. This paper focuses on a class of regularized empirical
risk minimization (ERM) machine learning problems, and de-
velops two methods to provide differential privacy to distributed
learning algorithms over a network. We first decentralize the
learning algorithm using the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM), and propose the methods of dual variable
perturbation and primal variable perturbation to provide dynamic
differential privacy. The two mechanisms lead to algorithms
that can provide privacy guarantees under mild conditions of
the convexity and differentiability of the loss function and the
regularizer. We study the performance of the algorithms, and
show that the dual variable perturbation outperforms its primal
counterpart. To design an optimal privacy mechanisms, we
analyze the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and accuracy,
and provide guidelines to choose privacy parameters. Numerical
experiments using customer information database are performed
to corroborate the results on privacy and utility tradeoffs and
design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed machine learning is a promising way to manage
deluge of data that has been witnessed recently. With the train-
ing data of size ranging from 1T B to 1PB [13], a centralized
machine learning approach that collects and processes the data
can lead to significant computational complexity and com-
munications overhead. Therefore, a decentralized approach to
machine learning is imperative to provide the scalability of the
data processing and improve the quality of decision-making,
while reducing the computational cost.
One suitable approach to decentralize a centralized ma-
chine learning problem is alternating direction method of
multiplier (ADMM). It enables distributed training over a
network of collaborative nodes who exchange their results with
the neighbors. However, the communications between two
neighboring nodes create serious privacy concerns for nodes
who process sensitive data including social network data, web
search histories, financial information, and medical records.
An adversary can observe the outcome of the learning and
acquire sensitive information of the training data of individual
nodes. The adversary can be either a member of the learning
network who observes its neighbors or an outsider who
observes the entire network. A privacy-preserving mechanism
needs to automatically build into the distributed machine
learning scheme to protect the internal and external adversaries
throughout the entire dynamic learning process. Differential
privacy is a suitable concept that provides a strong guarantee
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that the removal or addition of a single database item does not
allow an adversary to distinguish (substantially) an individual
data point [8].
In this work, we focus on a class of distributed ADMM-
based empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems, and de-
velop randomized algorithms that can provide differential
privacy [8, 17] while keeping the learning procedure accurate.
We extend the privacy concepts to dynamic differential privacy
to capture the nature of distributed machine learning over
networks, and propose two privacy-preserving schemes of the
regularized ERM-based optimization. The first method is dual
variable perturbation (DVP), in which we perturb the dual
variable of each node at every ADMM iteration. The second
is the primal variable perturbation (PVP) which leverages the
output perturbation technique developed by Dwork et al. [8]
by adding noise to the update process of primal variable of
each node of the ADMM-based distributed algorithm before
sharing it to neighboring nodes.
We investigate the performance of the algorithms, and show
that the DVP outperforms PVP. We characterize the funda-
mental tradeoffs between privacy and accuracy by formulating
an optimization problem and use numerical experiments to
demonstrate the optimal design of privacy mechanisms. The
main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
(i) We use ADMM to decentralize regularized ERM
algorithms to achieve distributed training of large
datasets. Dynamic differential privacy is guaranteed
for the distributed algorithm using the DVP, which
adds noise to the update of the dual variable.
(ii) We develop PVP method to add noise to the primal
variables when they are transmitted to neighboring
nodes. This approach guarantees dynamic differential
privacy in which privacy is preserved at each update.
(iii) We provide the theoretical performance guarantees of
the PVP perturbations of the distributed ERM with l2
regularization. The performance is measured by the
number of sample data points required to achieve a
certain criteria. Our theoretical results show that DVP
is prefered for more difficult learning problems that
is non-separable or with small margin.
(iv) We propose a design principle to select the optimal
privacy parameters by solving an optimization prob-
lem. Numerical experiments show that the PVP out-
performs the DVP at managing the privacy-accuracy
tradeoff.
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2A. Related Work
There has been a significant amount of literature on the
distributed classification learning algorithms. These works
have mainly focused on either enhancing the efficiency of
the learning model, or on producing a global classifier from
multiple distributed local classifier trained at individual nodes.
Researchers have focused on making the distributed algorithm
suitable to large-scale datasets, e.g., MapReduce has been used
to explore the performance improvements [7]. In addition,
methods such as ADMM methods [10], voting classification
[5], and mixing parameters [14] have been used to achieve
distributed computation. Our approach to distributed machine
learning is based on ADMM, in which the centralized problem
acts as a group of coupled distributed convex optimization
subproblems with the consensus constraints on the decision
parameters over a network.
In privacy-preserving data mining research, the privacy can
be pried through, for example, composition attacks, in which
the adversary has some prior knowledge. Other works on
data perturbation for privacy (e.g., [9],[12]) have focused on
additive or multiplicative perturbations of individual samples,
which might affect certain relationships among different sam-
ples in the database. A body of existing literature also have
studied the differential-private machine learning. For example,
Kasiviswanathan et al. have derived a general method for
probabilistically approximately correct (PAC, [21]) in [11].
Many works have investigated the tradeoff privacy and accu-
racy while developing and exploring the theory of differential
privacy (examples include [2, 8, 15]). In this work, we extend
the notion of differential privacy to a dynamic setting, and
define dynamic differential privacy to capture the distributed
and iterative nature of the ADMM-based distributed ERM.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the ADMM approach to decentralize a centralized
ERM problem, and describe the privacy concerns associated
with the distributed machine learning. In Section 3, we present
dual and primal variable perturbation algorithms to provide
dynamic differential privacy. The analysis of privacy guarantee
for the algorithms is discussed. Section 4 studies the perfor-
mance of the privacy-preserving algorithms. Section 5 presents
numerical experiments to corroborate the results and optimal
design principles to tradeoff between privacy and accuracy.
Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks and future
research directions.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a connected network, which contains P nodes
described by one undirected graph G(P,E ) with the set of
nodes P = {1,2,3, ...,P}, and a set of edges E represented
by lines denoting the links between connected nodes. A
particular node p ∈P only exchanges information between
its neighboring node j ∈Np, where j ∈Np is the set of all
neighboring nodes of node p, and Np = |Np| is the number of
neighboring nodes of node p. Each node p contains a dataset
Dp = {(xip,yip)⊂ X×Y : i = 0,1, ...,Bp}, which is of size Bp
with data vector xip ∈ X ⊆ Rd , and the corresponding label
yip ∈ Y := {−1,1}. The entire network therefore has a set of
data Dˆ =
⋃
p∈P Dp.
The target of the centralized classification algorithm is to
find a classifier f : X → Y using all available data Dˆ that
enables the entire network to classify any data x′ input to a
label y′ ∈ {−1,1}. Let ZC1( f |Dˆ) be the objective function of a
regularized empirical risk minimization problem (CR-ERM),
defined as follows:
ZC1( f |Dˆ) :=
CR
Bp
P
∑
p=1
Bp
∑
i=1
Lˆ (yip, f T xip)+ρR( f ), (1)
where CR ≤ Bp is a regularization parameter, and ρ > 0 is the
parameter that controls the impact of the regularizer. Suppose
that Dˆ is available to the fusion center node, then we can
choose the global classifier f : X →Y that minimizes the CR-
ERM.
The loss function Lˆ (yip, f T xip) :Rd →R, is used to mea-
sure the quality of the classifier trained. In this paper, we focus
on the specific loss function Lˆ (yip, f T xip) = L (yip f T xip).
The function R( f ) in (1) is a regularizer that prevents overfit-
ting. In this paper, we have the following assumptions on the
loss, regularization functions, and the data.
Assumption 1. The loss function L is strictly convex and
doubly differentiable of f with |L ′| ≤ 1 and |L ′′| ≤ c1, where
c1 is a constant. Both L and L ′ are continuous.
Assumption 2. The regularizer function R(·) is continuous
differentiable and 1-strongly convex. Both R(·) and ∇R(·) are
continuous.
Assumption 3. We assume that ‖xip‖≤ 1. Since yip ∈ {−1,1},
|yip|= 1.
A. Distributed ERM
To decentralize CR-ERM, we introduce decision variables
{ fp}Pp=1, where node p determines its own classifier fp, and
impose consensus constraints f1 = f2 = ...= fP that guarantee
global consistency of the classifiers. Let {w jp} be the auxiliary
variables to decouple fp of node p from its neighbors j ∈Np.
Then, the consensus-based reformulation of (1) becomes
min
{ fp}Pp=1
ZC2 :=
CR
Bp
P
∑
p=1
Bp
∑
i=1
L (yip f Tp xip)+
P
∑
p=1
ρR( fp).
s.t. fp = wp j, wp j = f j, p = 1, ...,P, j ∈Np
(2)
where ZC2({ fp}p∈P |Dˆ) is the reformulated objective as a
function of { fp}Pp=1. According to Lemma 1 in [10], if
{ fp}Pp=1 presents a feasible solution of (2) and the network
is connected, then problems (1) and (2) are equivalent, i.e.,
f = fp, p= 1, ...,P, where f is a feasible solution of CR-ERM.
Problem (2) can be solved in a distributed fashion using the
alternative direction method of multiplier (ADMM) with each
node p ∈P optimizing the following distributed regularized
empirical risk minimization problem (DR-ERM):
Zp( fp|Dp) := C
R
Bp
Bp
∑
i=1
L (yip f Tp xip)+ρR( fp). (3)
3Algorithm 1 Distributed ERM
Required: Randomly initialize fp,λp = 0d×1 for every p ∈P
Input: Dˆ
for t = 0,1,2,3, ... do
for p = 0 to P do
Compute fp(t+1) via (10).
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Broadcast fp(t+1) to all neighbors j ∈Np.
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Compute λp(t+1) via (11).
end for
end for
Output: f ∗.
The augmented Lagrange function associated with the DR-
ERM is:
LDp ( fp,wp j,λ
k
p j)
= Zp+ ∑
i∈Np
(
λ api
)T
( fp−wpi)+ ∑
i∈Np
(
λ bpi
)T
(wpi− fi)
+
η
2 ∑i∈Np
(‖ fp−wpi ‖2 + ‖ wpi− fi ‖2).
(4)
The distributed iterations solving (3) are:
fp(t+1) = argmin
fp
LDp
(
fp,wp j(t),λ kp j(t)
)
, (5)
wp j(t+1) = argmin
wp j
LDp
(
fp(t+1),wp j,λ kp j(t)
)
, (6)
λ ap j(t+1) = λ
a
p j(t)+η( fp(t+1)−wp j(t+1)),
p ∈P, j ∈Np,
(7)
λ bp j(t+1) = λ
b
p j(t)+η(wp j(t+1)− fp(t+1)),
p ∈P, j ∈Np.
(8)
According to Lemma 2 in [10], iterations (5) to (8) can be
further simplified by initializing the dual variables λ kp j = 0d×d ,
and letting λp(t) = ∑ j∈Np λ
k
p j, p ∈P , j ∈Np, k = a, b, we
can combine (7) and (8) into one update. Thus, we simplify
(5)-(8) by introducing the following: Let LNp (t) be the short-
hand notation of LNp ({ fp},{ fp(t)},{λp(t)}) as :
LNp (t) :=
CR
Bp
Bp
∑
i=1
L (yip f Tp xip)+ρR( fp)+2λp(t)
T fp
+η ∑
i∈Np
‖ fp− 12 ( fp(t)+ fi(t)) ‖
2 .
(9)
The ADMM iterations (5)-(8) can be reduced to
fp(t+1) = argmin
fp
LNp ( fp, fp(t),λp(t)), (10)
λp(t+1) = λp(t)+
η
2 ∑j∈Np
[ fp(t+1)− f j(t+1)]. (11)
ADMM-based distributed ERM iterations (10)-(11) is and
summarized in Algorithm 1. Every node p ∈P updates its
local d×1 estimates fp(t) and λp(t). At iteration t+1, node
p updates the local fp(t + 1) through (10). Next, node p
broadcasts the latest fp(t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes
j ∈ Np. Iteration t + 1 finishes as each node updates the
λp(t+1) via (11).
Every iteration of our algorithm is still a minimization
problem similar to the centralized problem (1). However,
the number of variables participating in solving (10) per
node per iteration is Np, which is much smaller than the
one in the centralized problem, which is ∑Pp=1 Np. There are
several methods to solve (10 ). For instance, projected gradi-
ent method, Newton method, and Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (BFGS) method [6] that approximates the Newton
method, to name a few.
ADMM-based distributed machine learning has benefits
due to its high scalability. It also provides a certain level
of privacy since nodes do not communicate data directly
but their decision variable fp. However, the privacy arises
when an adversary can make intelligent inferences at each
step and extract the sensitive information based on his ob-
servation of the learning output of his neighboring nodes.
Simple anonymization is not sufficient to address this issue as
discussed in Section 1. In the following subsection, we will
discuss the adversary models, and present differential privacy
solutions.
B. Privacy Concerns
Although the data stored at each node is not exchanged
during the entire ADMM algorithm, the potential privacy risk
still exists. Suppose that the dataset Dp stored at node p
contains sensitive information in data point (xi,yi) that is not
allowed to be released to other nodes in the network or anyone
else outside. Let K :Rd→R be the randomized version of Al-
gorithm 1, and let { f ∗p}p∈P be the output of K at all the nodes.
Then, the output { f ∗p}p∈P is random. In the distributed version
of the algorithm, each node optimizes its local empirical risk
based on its own dataset Dp. Let Ktp be the node-p-dependent
stochastic sub-algorithm of K at iteration t, and let fp(t) be
the output of Ktp(Dp) at iteration t inputing Dp. Hence the
output fp(t) is stochastic at each t. In this work, we consider
the following attack model. The adversary can access the
learning outputs of intermediate ADMM iterations as well as
the final output. This type of adversary aims to obtain sensitive
information about the private data point of the training dataset
by observing the output fp(t) of Ktp or f
∗
p of K for all p ∈P
at every stage t of the training. We protect the privacy of
distributed network using the definition of differential privacy
in [8]. Specifically, we require that a change of any single
data point in the dataset might only change the distribution
of the output of the algorithm slightly, which is visible to the
adversary; this is done by adding randomness to the output of
the algorithm. Let Dp and D′p be two datasets differing in one
data point; i.e., let (xip,yip) ⊂ Dp, and (x′ip,y′ip) ⊂ D′p, then
(xip,yip) 6= (x′ip,y′ip). In other words, their Hamming Distance,
which is defined as Hd(Dp,D′p) =∑
Bp
i=0 1{i : xi 6= x′i}, equals 1;
i.e., Hd(Dp,D′p) = 1.
To protect the privacy against the adversary, we propose
the concept of dynamic differential privacy, which enables the
dynamic algorithm to be privacy-preserving at every stage of
the learning.
4Definition 1. (Dynamic α(t)-Differential Privacy (DDP))
Consider a network of P nodes P = {1, 2, ..., P}, and each
node p has a training dataset Dp, and Dˆ =
⋃
p∈P Dp. Let
K : Rd → R be a randomized version of Algorithm 1. Let
α(t) = (α1(t),α2(t), ...,αP(t)) ∈RP+, where αp(t) ∈R+ is the
privacy parameter of node p at iteration t. Let Ktp be the
node-p-dependent sub-algorithm of K, which corresponds to
an ADMM iteration at t that outputs fp(t). Let D′p be any
dataset with Hd(D′p,Dp) = 1, and gp(t) =Ktp(D′p). We say that
the algorithm K is dynamic αp(t)-differential private (DDP)
if for any dataset D′p, and for all p ∈P that can be observed
by an adversary of Type 2, and for all possible sets of the
outcomes S⊆R, the following inequality holds:
Pr[ fp(t) ∈ S]≤ eαp(t) ·Pr[gp(t) ∈ S], (12)
for all t ∈ Z during a learning process. The probability is
taken with respect to fp(t), the output of Ktp at every stage t.
The algorithm K is called dynamic α(t)-differential private if
the above conditions are satisfied.
Definition 1 provides a suitable differential privacy concept
for the adversary. For dynamic αp(t)-differential private algo-
rithms, the adversaries cannot extract additional information
by observing the intermediate updates of fp(t) at each step.
Clearly, the algorithm with ADMM iterations shown in (10) to
(11) is not dynamic αp(t)-differential private. This is because
the intermediate and final optimal output fp’s are determin-
istic given dataset Dp. For D′p with Hd(Dp,D′p) = 1, the
classifier will change completely, and the probability density
Pr([ fp|D′p]) = 0, which leads to the ratio of probabilities
Pr[ fp|Dp]
Pr[ fp|D′p] → ∞. In order to provide the DDP, we propose two
algorithms, dual variable perturbation and primal variable
perturbation, which are described in Section 3.1 and 3.2,
respectively.
III. DYNAMIC PRIVATE PRESERVING
A. Dual Variable Perturbation
In this subsection, we describe two algorithms that provide
dynamic α-differential privacy defined in Section 2.2. We
protect the first algorithm based on dual variable perturbation
(DVP), in which the dual variables {λp(t)}Pp=1 are perturbed
with a random noise vector εp(t) ∈ Rd with the probability
density function Kp(ε)∼ e−ζp(t)‖ε‖, where ζp(t) is a param-
eter related to the value of αp(t), and ‖ · ‖ denotes the l2
norm. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable
λp(t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a
new variable µp(t) = λp(t) + εp(t). Now the corresponding
node-p-based augmented Lagrange function LNp (t) becomes
Ldualp
(
fp, fp(t),µp(t+1),{ fi(t)}i∈Np
)
, defined as follows, and
Ldualp (t) is used as a short-hand notation:
Ldualp (t) =
CR
Bp
Bp
∑
i=1
L (yip f Tp xip)+ρR( fp)
+2µp(t+1)T fp+
Φ
2
‖ fp ‖2
+η ∑
i∈Np
‖ fp− 12 ( fp(t)+ fi(t)) ‖
2,
(13)
Algorithm 2 Dual Variable Perturbation
Required: Randomly initialize fp,λp = 0d×1 for every p ∈P
Input: Dˆ, {[αp(1),αp(2), ...]}Pp=1
for t = 0,1,2,3, ... do
for p = 0 to P do
Let αˆp = αp(t)− ln
(
1+ c1Bp
CR
(
ρ+2ηNp
))2.
if αˆp > 0 then
Φ= 0.
else
Φ= c1Bp
CR
(eαp(t)/4−1)− ρ−2ηNp and αˆp = αp(t)/2.
end if
Draw noise εp(t) according to Kp(ε) ∼ e−ζp(t)‖ε‖ with
ζp(t) = αˆp.
Compute µp(t+1) via (14).
Compute fp(t+1) via (15) with augmented Lagrange func-
tion as (13).
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Broadcast fp(t+1) to all neighbors j ∈Np.
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Compute λp(t+1) via (16).
end for
end for
Output: { f ∗p}Pp=1.
where Φ2 ‖ fp ‖2 is an additional penalty. As a result, the
minimizer of Ldualp (t) is random. At each iteration, we first
perturb the dual variable λp(t), obtained from the last iteration,
and store it in a new variable µp(t+1).
Now, the iterations (10)-(11) becomes follows:
µp(t+1) = λp(t)+
CR
2Bp
εp(t+1), (14)
fp(t+1) = argmin
fp
Ldualp (t), (15)
λp(t+1) = λp(t)+
η
2 ∑j∈Np
[ fp(t+1)− f j(t+1)]. (16)
The iterations (14)-(16) are summarized as Algorithm 2,
and are illustrated in Figure 1 and 3. All nodes have its
corresponding value of ρ . Every node p∈P updates its local
estimates µp(t), fp(t) and λp(t) at time t; at time t+1, node
p first perturbs the dual variable λp(t) obtained at time t to
obtain µp(t+1) via (14), and then uses training dataset Dp to
compute fp(t + 1) via (15). Next, node p sends fp(t + 1) to
all its neighboring nodes. The (t+1)-th update is done when
each node updates its local λp(t +1) via (16). We then have
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, if the DR-ERM
problem can be solved by Algorithm 2, then Algorithm 2 solv-
ing this distributed problem is dynamic α-differential private
with αp(t) for each node p∈P at time t. Let Q( fp(t)|D) and
Q( fp(t)|D′p) be the probability density functions of fp(t) given
dataset D and D′p, respectively, with Hd(D,D′p) = 1. The ratio
of conditional probabilities of fp(t) is bounded as follows:
Q( fp(t)|D)
Q( fp(t)|D′p)
≤ eαp(t). (17)
5(a) DVP during intermediate iterations (b) PVP during intermediate iterations
Figure 1. (a): DVP during intermediate iterations. The pertured µp participates in the (15). As a result, the output fp at each iteration is a random variable,
and the transmission of fp is differential private. (b): PVP during intermediate iterations. The pertured Vp is a random variable. As a result, the transmission
of Vp is differential private.
Figure 2. The final iteration of both DVP and PVP. The pertured µp
participates in the (15). As a result, the output f ∗p is a random variable,
and the final output is differential private.
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. Primal Variable Perturbation
In this subsection, we provide the algorithm based on
the primal variable perturbation (PVP), which perturbs the
primal variable { fp(t + 1)}Pp=0 before sending the decision
to the neighboring nodes. This algorithm can also pro-
vide dynamic differential privacy defined in Definition 1
and 2. Let the node-p-based augmented Lagrange function
Lprimp
(
fp, fp(t),εp(t),λp(t),{Vi(t)}i∈Np
)
be defined as follows,
and use Lprimp (t) as its short hand notation:
Lprimp (t) =
CR
Bp
Bp
∑
i=1
L (yip f Tp xip)+ρR( fp)+2λp(t)
T fp
+η ∑
i∈Np
‖ fp− 12 ( fp(t)+Vi(t)− εp(t)) ‖
2 .
In this method, we divide the entire training process into two
parts: (i) the intermediate iterations, and (ii) the final interation.
During the intermediate iterations, we use the unperturbed
primal fp(t) obtained at time t in the augmented Lagrange
function and subtract the noise vector εp(t) added at time t
to reduce the noise in the minimization in (19). Note that the
noise εp(t) at time t is known at time t + 1. The privacy of
releasing primal variable is not affected.
The corresponding ADMM iterations that can provide dy-
namic αp(t)-differential privacy at time t are as follows:
fp(t+1) = argmin
fp
Lprimp (t), (18)
Vp(t+1) = fp(t+1)+ εp(t+1), (19)
λp(t+1) = λp(t)+
η
2 ∑j∈Np
[Vp(t+1)−Vj(t+1)], (20)
where εp(t + 1) is the random noise vector with the density
function Kp(ε) ∼ e−ζp(t)‖ε‖. The augmented Lagrange func-
tion is (9). Let ts be the time when we enter the final iteration.
When t = ts we enter the final iteration at ts, we apply the
DVP to update the variables. Specifically, we input the data
sets Dˆ to DVP and use the { fp(ts− 1)}p and {λp(ts− 1)}p,
obtained from (18) and (20), in iteration (14)-(16):
µp(ts+1) = λp(ts)+
CR
2Bp
εp(ts+1), (21)
fp(t+1) = argmin
fp
Ldualp (ts), (22)
λp(ts+1) = λp(ts)+
η
2 ∑j∈Np
[ fp(ts+1)− f j(ts+1)]. (23)
{ fp(ts+1)}p∈P is the final output of the PVP algorithm.
The iterations (18)-(20) and (21)-(23) are summarized in
Algorithm 3, and are illustrated in Figure 4 and 5. Each node
p ∈P updates fp(t), Vp(t) and λp(t) at time t. Then, at time
t+1, the training dataset is used to compute fp(t+1) via (18),
which is then perturbed to obtain Vp(t + 1) via (19). Next,
Vp(t + 1) is distributed to all the neighboring nodes of node
p. Finally, λp(t + 1) is updated via (20). The final iteration
follows the DVP. We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, if the DR-ERM
problem can be solved by Algorithm 3, then Algorithm 3
solving this distributed problem is dynamic α(t)-differential
private. The ratio of conditional probabilities of fp(t) is
bounded as in (17).
Proof: See Appendix C.
6Algorithm 3 Primal Variable Perturbation
Required: Randomly initialize fp,λp = 0d×1 for every p ∈P
Input: Dˆ, {[αp(1),αp(2), ...]}Pp=1.
for t = 0,1,2,3, ... do
for p = 0 to P do
Draw noise εp(t) according to Kp(ε) ∼ e−ζp(t)‖ε‖ with
ζp(t) =
ρBpαp(t)
2CR .
Compute fp(t+1) via (18) with augmented Lagrange func-
tion as (9).
Compute Vp(t+1) via (19).
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Broadcast fp(t+1) to all neighbors j ∈Np.
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Compute λp(t+1) via (20).
if t = stop time then
Use the latest { fp(t)}p and {λp(t)}p obtained as initial
values, and input Dˆ to Algorithm 2 to iterate the loop
once.
end if
end for
end for
Output: { f ∗p}Pp=1.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the performance of Algorithm
2 and 3. We establish performance bounds for regularization
functions with l2 norm. Our analysis is based on the following
assumptions:
Assumption 4. The data points {(xpi,ypi)}Bpi=1 are drawn i.i.d.
from a fixed but unknown probability distribution Pxy(xpi,ypi)
at each node p ∈P .
Assumption 5. εp(t) is drawn from (15) with the same
αp(t) = α(t) for all p ∈P at time t ∈ Z.
We then define the expected loss of node p using
classifier fp as follows, under Assumption 4: Cˆ( fp) :=
CRE(x,y)∼Pxy(L (y f T x)), and the corresponding expected ob-
jective function Zˆ is: Zˆp( fp) := Cˆ( fp) + ρR( fp). The per-
formance of non-private non-distributed ERM classification
learning has been already studied by, for example, Shalev
et al. in [19] (also see the work of Chaudhuri et al. in
[3]), which introduces a reference classifier f 0 with expected
loss Cˆ( f 0), and shows that if the number of data points is
sufficiently large, then the actual expected loss of the trained
l2 regularized support vector machine (SVM) classifier fSV M
satisfies Cˆ( fSV M)≤ Cˆ0+αacc, where αacc is the generalization
error. We use a similar argument to study the accuracy of
Algorithm 1. Let f 0 be the reference classifier of Algorithm
1. We quantify the performance of our algorithms with f ∗ as
the final output by the number of data points required to obtain
Cˆ( f ∗)≤ Cˆ0+αacc.
However, instead of focusing on only the final output,
we care about the learning performance at all iterations.
Let f nonp (t +1) = argmin fp L
N
p (t) be the intermediate updated
classifier at t, and let f ∗ = argmin fp Zp( fp|Dp) be the final
output of Algorithm 1. From Theorem 9 (see Appendix A), the
sequence { f nonp (t)} is bounded and converges to the optimal
value f ∗ as time t → ∞. Note that { f nonp (t)} is a non-private
classifier without added perturbations. Since the optimization
is minimization, then there exists a constant ∆non(t) at time t
such that: Cˆ( f nonp (t))−Cˆ( f ∗)≤ ∆non(t), and substituting it to
Cˆ( f ∗)≤ Cˆ0+αacc, yields:
Cˆ( f nonp (t))≤ Cˆ0+∆non(t)+αacc. (24)
Clearly, the above condition depends on the reference classifier
f 0; actually, as shown later in this section, the number of data
points depends on the l2-norm ‖ f 0 ‖ of the reference classifier.
Usually, the reference classifier is chosen with an upper bound
on ‖ f 0 ‖, say b0. Based on (24), we provide the following
theorem about the performance of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. Let R( fp(t)) = 12 ‖ fp(t) ‖2, and let f 0 such that
Cˆ( f 0) = Cˆ0 for all p ∈P at time t, and δ > 0 is a positive
real number. Let f nonp (t + 1) = argmin fp L
N
p ( fp, t|Dp) be the
output of Algorithm 1. If Assumption 1 and 4 are satisfied, then
there exists a constant βnon such that if the number of data
points, Bp in Dp =
{
(xip,yip)⊂Rd×{−1,1}
}
satisfy: Bp >
βnon
(
CR‖ f 0‖2ln( 1δ )
α2acc
)
, then f nonp (t + 1) satisfies: P
(
Cˆ( f nonp (t +
1))≤ Cˆ0+αacc+∆non(t)
)≥ 1−δ . for all t ∈ Z+.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note that αacc ≤ 1 is required for most machine learning
algorithms. In the case of SVM, if the constraints are yi f T xi ≤
cSV M , for i = 1, , ..., n, where n is the number of data points,
then, classification margin is csvm/ ‖ f ‖. Thus, if we want to
maximization the margin cSV M/ ‖ f 0 ‖ we need to choose large
value of ‖ f 0 ‖. Larger value of ‖ f 0 ‖ is usually chosen for
non-separable or with small margin. In the following section,
we provide the performance guarantees of Algorithm 2 and 3.
A. Performance of Private Algorithms
Similar to Algorithm 1, we solve an optimization problem
minimizing Ldualp ( fp, t|Dp) at each iteration. Let fp(t) and
λp(t) be the primal and dual variables used in minimizing
Ldualp ( fp, t|Dp) at iteration t, respectively. Suppose that starting
from iteration t, the noise vector is static with εp(t) generated
at iteration t. To compare our private classifier at iteration
t with a private reference classifier f 0(t), we construct a
corresponding algorithm, Alg-2, associated with Algorithm 2.
However, starting from iteration t + 1, the noise vector in
Alg-2 εp(t ′) = εp(t) for all t ′ > t. In other words, solving
Alg-2 is equivalent to solving the optimization problem with
the objective function Zdualp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t)), t ≥ 0 defined as
follows:
Zdualp ( fp, t|Dp,εp(t)) := Zp( fp|Dp)+
CR
Bp
εp(t) fp.
Let f ′p(t) and λ ′p(t) be the updated variables of the
ADMM-based algorithm minimizing Zdualp ( fp, t|Dp) at it-
eration t. Then, Alg-2 can be interpreted as minimizing
Zdualp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t)) with initial condition as f ′p(0) = fp(t)
and λ ′p(0) = λp(t) for all p∈P . Let Zdualp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t)) be
regarded as the associated objective function of Alg-2.
For PVP, we can also introduce a similar algorithm
denoted as Alg-3. Let ε pi(t) = εp(t) − εi(t), for i ∈ Np.
7Then, the associated objective function of Alg-3 denoted by
Zprimp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t)), t ≥ 0, is defined as follows:
Zprimp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t)) := Zp( fp|Dp)
−η ∑
i∈Np
(
( fp− 12 ( fp(t)+ fi(t))
T · (ε pi(t))+ 1
4
(
ε pi(t)
)2)
.
Since both Zdualp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t)) and Zprimp ( fp, t|Dp,ε pi(t))
are real and convex, then, similar to Algorithm 1, the se-
quence { fp(t)} is bounded and fp(t) converges to f ∗p(t),
which is a limit point of fp(t). Thus, there exists a constant
∆privp (t) = ∆dualp (t) or ∆
prim
p (t) given noise vector εp(t) such
that Cˆ( fp(t))−Cˆ( f ∗p(t))≤ ∆privp (t). The performance analysis
in Theorem 3 can also used in DVP and PVP. Specifically, the
performance is measured by the number of data points, Bp, for
all p∈P required to obtain Cˆ( fp(t))≤ Cˆ0(t)+αacc+∆privp (t).
We say that every learned fp(t) is αacc-optimal if it satisfies
the above inequality.
Since in Alg-3, the perturbed primal variable Vp(t ′) is equal
to fp(t ′) plus a constant εp(t) generated by Algorithm 3 at
iteration t, for t ′ ≥ 0, we can find a constant ∆primVp (t) such
that Cˆ(Vp(t))− Cˆ(V ∗p (t)) ≤ ∆primVp (t). Similarly, we measure
the performance of Vp by the number of data points, Bp, for all
p∈P required to achieve Cˆ(Vp(t))≤ Cˆ0(t)+αacc+∆primVp (t),
where Cˆ0(t) = Cˆ( f 0(t)),and f 0(t) is a reference classifier.
We now establish the performance bounds for Algorithm 2,
DVP, which is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let R( fp(t)) = 12 ‖ fp(t) ‖2, and f 0p(t) such that
Cˆ( f 0p(t)) = Cˆ
0(t) for all p ∈P , and a real number δ > 0.
If Assumption 1, 4 and 5 are satisfied, then there exists a
constant βdual such that if the number of data points, Bp in
Dp =
{
(xip,yip)⊂Rd×{−1,1}
}
satisfy:
Bp > βdual max
(
max
t
(‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖ d ln( dδ )
αaccαp(t)
)
,
max
t
(CRc1 ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2
αaccαp(t)
)
,max
t
(CR ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 ln( 1δ )
α2acc
))
,
then f ∗p(t+1) satisfies: P
(
Cˆ( f ∗p(t+1))≤ Cˆ0(t+1)+αacc
)≥
1−2δ .
Proof: See Appendix E.
Corollary 4.1. Let fp(t+1) = argmin fp Ldualp ( fp, t|Dp) be the
updated classifier of Algorithm 2 and let f 0p(t) be a reference
classifier such that Cˆ( f 0p(t) = Cˆ
0(t). If all the conditions of
Theorem 3 are satisfied, then fp(t+1) satisfies
P
(
Cˆ( fp(t+1))≤ Cˆ0(t)+αacc+∆dualp (t)
)≥ 1−2δ . (25)
Proof:
Cˆ( fp(t))−Cˆ( f ∗p(t))≤∆dualp (t). holds for fp(t) and f ∗p(t) and
from Theorem 3, P
(
Cˆ( f ∗p(t+1))≤ Cˆ0(t+1)+αacc
)≥ 1−2δ .
Therefore, we can have (25).
Theorem 4 and Corollary 4.1 can guarantee the privacy
defined in both Definition 1 and 2. The following theorem is
used to analyze the performance bound of classifier fp(t+1)
in (18), which minimizes Lprimp (t) that involves noise vectors
from Vp(t) perturbed at the previous iteration.
Theorem 5. Let R( fp(t)) = 12 ‖ fp(t) ‖2, and f 0p(t) such that
Cˆ( f 0p(t)) = Cˆ
0(t), and a real number δ > 0. From Assumption
1, we have the loss function L (·) is convex and differentiable
with L ′(·)≤ 1. If Assumption 4 and 5 are satisfied, then there
exists a constant βAprim such that if the number of data points,
Bp in Dp =
{
(xip,yip)⊂Rd×{−1,1}
}
satisfies:
Bp > βAprim max
(
max
t
(CR ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖3 ηNpd ln( dδ )
α2accαp(t)
)
,
max
t
(CR ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 ln( 1δ )
α2acc
))
,
then f ∗p (t+1) satisfies P
(
Cˆ( f ∗p (t+1))≤ Cˆ0(t+1)+αacc
)≥ 1−2δ .
Proof: See Appendix F.
Next, we establish the PVP performance bound of Algo-
rithm 3. Theorem 6 and Corollary 6.1 shows the requirements
under which the performance of the part 1 of Algorithm 3 is
guaranteed. Corollary 6.2 combines the results from Theorem
5 and Corollary 6.2 to provide the performance bound of the
part 2 of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 6. Let R( fp(t)) = 12 ‖ fp(t) ‖2, and f 0p(t) such that
Cˆ( f 0p(t)) = Cˆ
0(t), and δ > 0 is a positive real number. Let
f ∗p(t + 1) = argmin fp Z
prim
p (t) be αacc-accurate according to
Theorem 4. In addition to Assumption 1, we also assume that
L ′ satisfies: |L ′(a)−L ′(b)| ≤ c4|a− b| for all pairs (a,b)
with a constant c4. If Assumption 4 and 5 are satisfied, then
there exists a constant βBprim such that if the number of data
points, Bp in Dp =
{
(xip,yip)⊂Rd×{−1,1}
}
satisfies:
Bp >βBprim max
(
max
t
(CR ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖3 ηNpd ln( dδ )
α2accαp(t)
)
,
max
t
(CR ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 ln( 1δ )
α2acc
)
,
max
t
(4CB ‖ f 0(t+1) ‖ d( ln( dδ ))2
αaccαp(t)
)
,
(26)
max
t
(4 ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖3 ηNpd ln( dδ )
α2accαp(t)
)
,
max
t
(4(CR) 32 ‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 d ln( dδ )
α3/2acc αp(t)
))
,
then V ∗p (t+1) = f ∗p(t+1)+ εp(t+1) satisfies P
(
Cˆ(V ∗p (t+
1))≤ Cˆ0(t+1)+αacc
)≥ 1−3δ .
Proof: See Appendix G.
Corollary 6.1. Let fp(t+1) = argmin fp L
prim
p ( fp, t|Dp) be the
updated classifier of Algorithm 3, and let f 0p(t) be a reference
classifier such that Cˆ( f 0p(t) = Cˆ
0(t). If all the conditions of
Theorem 5 are satisfied, then, Vp(t+1) = fp(t+1)+εp(t+1)
satisfies
P
(
Cˆ(Vp(t+1))≤ Cˆ0(t)+αacc+∆primVp (t)
)≥ 1−3δ . (27)
Proof: From Theorem 6, V ∗p (t +1) satisfies P
(
Cˆ(V ∗p (t +
1)) ≤ Cˆ0(t + 1) +αacc
) ≥ 1− 3δ , and since Cˆ(Vp(t + 1))−
Cˆ(V ∗p (t+1))≤ ∆primVp (t+1), then, we have (27).
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Figure 3. Convergence of algorithms, at iteration t = 100 (before the stop time) with different values of αp(t). DVP with ρ = 10−2.5 and CR = 1750; PVP
with ρ = 10−1 and CR = 146; Algorithm 1 (non-private) with ρ = 10−10 and CR = 1750.
(a) DVP: t = 2 (b) DVP: t = 100 (c) PVP: t = 2 (d) PVP: t = 100
Figure 4. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff.(a)-(b): DVP, with ωp1 = 0.02, ωp2 = 6, ωp3 = 9, ωp4 = 1 (before the stop time); (c)-(d) PVP with ωp1 = 0.02, ωp2 = 6,
ωp3 = 9, ωp4 = 1 (before the stop time).
Corollary 6.2. Let f ∗p be the final output classifier of Algo-
rithm 3 at node p, and let f 0p(t) be a reference classifier such
that Cˆ( f 0p(t) = Cˆ
0(t). If all the conditions of Theorem 4 and
6 are satisfied, then, f ∗p satisfies
P
(
Cˆ( f ∗p)≤ Cˆ0(t)+αacc+∆dualp (t)
)≥ 1−5δ .
Proof: All the conditions of Theorem 6 are satisfied to
guarantee the privacy during the intermediate iterations. All the
conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied so that the final update
is differential privacy is provided. Combining Theorem 4 and
6 yields the results.
From Theorem 4 and 6, we can see that, for non-separable
problems or ones with a small margin, in which a larger
‖ f 0p(t) ‖ is used, the terms 1αacc and ‖ f 0p(t) ‖ have a more
significant influence on the requirement of datasets size for
DVP than the PVP. Also, the performance of DVP is guar-
anteed with higher probability than PVP. Therefore, DVP is
preferred for more difficult problems. Moreover, the privacy
increases by trading the accuracy. It is essential to manage the
tradeoff between the privacy and the accuracy, and this will
be discussed in Section 5.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section, we test Algorithm 2 and 3 with real world
training dataset. The dataset used is the Adult dataset from
UCI Machine Learning Repository [1], which contains demo-
graphic information such as age, sex, education, occupation,
marital status, and native country. In the experiments, we
use our algorithm to develop a dynamic differential private
logistic regression. The logistic regression, i.e., LLR takes the
following form: LLR(yip f T xip) = log(1 + exp(−yip f Tp xip)),
whose first-order derivative and the second-order derivative
can be bounded as |L ′LR| ≤ 1 and |L ′′LR| ≤ 14 , respectively, sat-
isfying Assumption 3. Therefore, the loss function of logistic
regression satisfies the conditions shown in Assumption 2 and
3. In this experiment, we set R( fp) = 12 ‖ fp ‖2, and c1 = 14 .
We can directly apply the loss function LLR to Theorem 1 and
2 with R( f ) = 12 ‖ fp ‖2, and c1 = 14 , and then it can provide
αp(t)-differential privacy for all t ∈ Z.
We also study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of Algorithm
2 and 3. The privacy is quantified by the value of αp(t).
A larger αp(t) implies that the ratio of the densities of the
classifier fp(t) on two different data sets is larger, which
implies a higher belief of the adversary when one data point in
dataset D is changed; thus, it provides lower privacy. However,
the accuracy of the algorithm increases as αp(t) becomes
larger. As shown in Figure 3, a larger αp(t) leads to faster
convergence of the algorithms; moreover, from Figure 3, we
can see that the DVP is slightly more robust to noise than
is the primal case given the same value of αp(t). When
αp(t) is small, the model is more private but less accurate.
Therefore, the utilities of privacy and accuracy need to satisfy
the following assumptions:
Assumption 6. The utilities of privacy is monotonically
increasing with respect to αp(t) for every p∈P but accuracy
is monotonically decreasing with respect to αp(t) for every
p ∈P .
The quality of classifier is measured by the total empirical
loss C(t) = C
R
Bp ∑
Bp
i=1L (yip fp(t)
T xip). Let Lacc(·) : R+ → R
represent the relationship between αp(t) and C(t). The func-
tion Lacc is obtained by curve fitting given the experimental
data points (αp(t),C(t)). Let Upriv(αp(t)) : R+ → R be the
utility of privacy, same for every node p ∈ P . Besides
the decreasing monotonicity, Upriv(αp(t)) is assumed to be
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Figure 5. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff. (a): Empirical risk vs. αp of final
optimum output. (b): Misclassifications error rate vs. αp of iteration 100.
convex and doubly differentiable function of αp(t). In our
experiment, we model the utility of privacy as: Upriv(αp(t)) =
ωp1 · ln ωp2ωp3αp(t)+ωp4α2p(t) , where, ωp j ∈ R for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
For training the classifier, we use a few fixed values of
ρ and test the empirical loss C(t) = C
R
Bp ∑
Bp
i=1LLR(t) of the
classifier. Then, we select the value of ρ that minimizes
the empirical loss for a fixed αp (0.3 in this experiment).
We also test the non-private version of algorithm, and the
corresponding minimum ρ is obtained as the control. We
choose the corresponding optimal values of the regularization
parameter ρ as 10−10, 10−2.5 and 10−1 for Algorithm 1, 2
and 3, respectively. The values of CR are chosen as 1750,
1750 and 146 for Algorithm 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Figure
5 shows the convergence of DVP and PVP at different values
of αp(t) at a given iteration t. Larger values of αp yield better
convergence for both perturbations. Moreover, the DVP has a
smaller variance of empirical loss than the primal perturbation
does. However, a larger αp leads to poorer privacy. Figure
4 (a)-(b) shows the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of DVP at
different iterations. By curve fitting, we model the function
Lacc(αp(t)) = c4 · e−c5αp(t)+ c6, where c4, c5,c6 ∈ R+. From
the experimental results, we determine c4 = 0.2, c5 = 25,
c6 = mint{C(t)}; these values are applicable at all iteraions.
Figure 4 (c)-(d) presents the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of
PVP at different iterations. We model the function Lacc in the
same way as DVP. In our experiment, we choose ωp1 = 0.02,
ωp2 = 6, ωp3 = 9, ωp4 = 1. From Figure 3, we can see
that the experimental results of Lacc(αp(t)) given {αp(t)} for
PVP experimences more oscillations than the DVP does. For
iteration t > 1, c4 = 20, c5 = 20, c6 = 181 ∑
100
t=20 C(t). As shown
in Figure 3, the empirical loss of DVP is more robust to
noise than the PVP for most values of αp(t). Moreover, the
dual perturbation yields a lower error rate for a large range
of values of αp(t), which implies a better management of
tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. Figure 5 shows the
privacy-accuracy tradeoff of the final optimum classifier in
terms of the empirical loss and misclassification error rate
(MER). The MER is determined by the fraction of times the
trained classifier predicts a wrong label. We can see that PVP
performs slightly better than DVP with respect to the empirical
loss.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have developed two ADMM-based algo-
rithms to solve a centralized regularized ERM in a distributed
fashion while providing α-differential privacy for the ADMM
iterations as well as the final trained output. Thus, the sensitive
information stored in the training dataset at each node is
protected against both the internal and the external adversaries.
Based on distributed training datasets, Algorithm 2 perturbs
the dual variable λp(t) for every node p ∈P at iteration t;
For the next iteration, t +1, the perturbed version of λp(t) is
involved in the update of primal variable fp(t+1). Thus, the
perturbation created at time t provides privacy at time t+1. In
Algorithm 3, we perturb the primal variable fp(t), whose noisy
version is then released to the neighboring nodes. Since the
primal variables are shared among all the neighboring nodes,
at time t, the noise directly involved in the optimization of
parameter update comes from multiple nodes; as a result, the
updated primal variable has more randomness than the dual
perturbation case.
In general, the accuracy decreases as privacy requirements
are more stringent. The tradeoff between the privacy and
accuracy is studied. Our experiments on real data from UCI
Machine Learning Repository show that dual variable pertur-
bation is more robust to the noise than the primal variable
perturbation. The dual variable perturbation outperforms the
primal case at balancing the privacy-accuracy tradeoff as well
as learning performance.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: (Theorem 1)
Let fp(t+1) be the optimal primal variable with zero duality
gap. From the Assumption 1 and 2, we know that both the
loss funciton L and the regularizer R(·) are differentiable
and convex, and by using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality condition (stationarity), we have the relationship
between the noise εp(t) and the optimal primal variable
fp(t+1) as:
εp(t) =−
Bp
∑
i=1
yipL ′(yip fp(t+1)T xip)xip− BpCR ρ∇R( fp)
− 2Bp
CR
λp(t)− BpCR (Φ+2ηNp) fp(t+1)
+
Bpη
CR ∑i∈Np
( fp(t)+ fi(t)).
(28)
Under Assumption 1, the augmented Lagrange function
Ldualp (t) is strictly convex, thus there is a unique value of
fp(t + 1) for fixed εp(t) and dataset Dp. The equation (28)
shows that for any value of fp(t + 1), we can find a unique
value of εp(t) such that fp(t + 1) is the minimizer of Ldualp .
Therefore, given a dataset Dp, the relation between εp(t) and
fp(t+1) is bijective.
Let Dp and D′p be two datasets with Hd(Dp,D′p) = 1,
(xi,yi) ∈ Dp and (x′i,y′i) ∈ D′p are the corresponding two
different data points. Let two matrices J f (εp(t)|Dp) and
J f (ε ′p(t)|D′p) denote the Jacobian matrices of mapping from
fp(t+1) to εp(t) and ε ′p(t), respectively. Then, transformation
10
from noise fp(t+1) to εp(t) by Jacobian yields:
Q( fp(t+1)|Dp)
Q( fp(t+1)|D′p)
=
q(εp(t)|Dp)
q(ε ′p(t)|D′p)
|det(J f (εp(t)|Dp))|−1
|det(J f (ε ′p(t)|D′p))|−1
,
(29)
where q(εp(t)|Dp) and q(ε ′p(t)|D′p) are the densities of εp(t)
and ε ′p(t), respectively, given fp(t +1) when the datasets are
Dp and D′p, respectively.
Therefore, in order to prove the ratio of
conditional densities of optimal primal variable is
bounded as: Q( fp(t)|D)Q( fp(t)|D′p) ≤ e
αp(t), we have to show:
q(εp(t)|Dp)
q(ε ′p(t)|D′p)
· |det(J f (εp(t)|Dp))|
−1
|det(J f (ε ′p(t)|D′p))|−1
≤ eαp(t). We first
bound the ratio of the determinant of Jacobian matrices, and
then the ratio of conditional densities of the noise vectors.
Let xa be the a-th element of the vector x, and (a,b). Let
E∈Rd×d be a matrix, then let E(a,b) denote the (a,b)-th entry
of the matrix E. Thus, the (m,n)-th entry of J f (εp(t)) is:
J f (εp(t))(m,n) =−
Bp
∑
i=1
(y2iL
′′(yi fp(t+1)T xi)x
(m)
i x
(n)
i
− Bp
CR
ρ∇2R( fp(t+1))(m,n)
− Bp
CR
(Φ+2ηNp)1( j = k).
Let J0f (xi,yi) = (y2iL ′′(yi fp(t+1)T xi)xixTi , then the Jacobian
matrix can be expressed as:
J f (εp(t)|Dp) =−
Bp
∑
i=1
J0f (xi,yi)−
Bp
CR
ρ∇2R( fp(t+1))
− Bp
CR
(Φ+2ηNp)Id .
Let M = J0f (x′i,y′i) − J0f (xi,yi), and H = −J f (εp(t)|Dp),
and thus J f (εp(t)|D′p) = −(M+H). Let h j(W) be the j-th
largest eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix W ∈ Rd×d with
rank θ . Then, we have the following fact: det(I + W) =
∏θj (1+h j(W)). Since the matrix xixTi has rank 1, matrix M
has rank at most 2; thus matrix H−1M has rank at most 2;
therefore, we have:
det(H+M) = det(H) ·det(I+H−1M)
= det(H) · (1+h1(H−1M))(1+h2(H−1M).
Thus, the ratio of determinants of the Jacobian matrices can
be expressed as:
|det(J f (εp(t)|Dp))|−1
|det(J f (ε ′p(t)|D′p))|−1
=
|det(H+M)|
|det(H)|
=|det(I+H−1M)|
=(1+h1(H−1M))(1+h2(H−1M)
=|1+h1(H−1M)+h2(H−1M)
+h1(H−1M)h2(H−1M)|.
Based on Assumption 2, all the eigenvalues of ∇2R( fp(t+
1)) is greater than 1 [16]. Thus, from Assumption 1, matrix
H has all eigenvalues at least BpCR
(
ρ+Φ+2ηNp
)
. Therefore,
|h1(H−1M)| ≤ |hi(M)|Bp
CR
(
ρ+Φ+2ηNp
) . Let σi(M) be the non-negative
singular value of the symmetric matrix M. According to [4],
we have the inequality ∑i |hi(M)| ≤ ∑iσi(M). Thus, we have
|h1(M)|+ |h2(M)| ≤ σ1(M)+σ2(M). Let ‖ X ‖Σ=∑iσi be the
trace norm of X. Then, according to the trace norm inequality,
we have ‖M ‖Σ≤‖ J0(x′i,y′i) ‖Σ + ‖ −J0(xi,yi) ‖Σ . As a result,
based on the upper bounds from Assumption 1 and 3, we have:
|h1(M)|+ |h2(M)| ≤‖ J0(x′i,y′i) ‖Σ + ‖ −J0(xi,yi) ‖Σ
≤ |(y2iL ′′(yi fp(t+1)T xi)|· ‖ xi ‖
+ |(y′2i L ′′(y′i fp(t+1)T x′i)|· ‖ x′i ‖≤ 2c1,
which follows h1(M)h2(M) ≤ c21. Finally, the ratio of deter-
minants of Jacobian matrices is bounded as:
|det(J f (εp(t)|Dp))|−1
|det(J f (ε ′p(t)|D′p))|−1
≤ (1+ c1Bp
CR
(
ρ+Φ+2ηNp
)
)
)2 = eα ,
(30)
where α = ln
(
1+ c1Bp
CR
(
ρ+Φ+2ηNp
))2.
Now, we bound the ratio of densities of εp(t). Let sur(E)
be the surface area of the sphere in d dimension with radius
E, and sur(E) = sur(1) ·Ed−1. We can write:
q(εp(t)|Dp)
q(ε ′p|D′p)
=
K (εp(t))
‖εp(t)‖d−1
sur(‖ε1(t)‖)
K (ε ′p(t))
‖ε ′p(t)‖d−1
sur(‖ε ′p(t)‖)
≤ eζp(t)(‖ε ′p(t)‖−‖εp(t)‖) ≤ eαˆp ,
(31)
where αˆp is a constant satisfying the above inequality. Since
we want to bound the ratio of densities of fp(t + 1) as
Q( fp(t+1)|Dp)
Q( fp(t+1)|D′p) ≤ e
αp(t), we need αˆp ≤ αp(t)− α. For non-
negative Φ, let αˆp = αp(t)− ln
(
1+ c1Bp
CR
(
ρ+2ηNp
))2. If αˆp > 0,
then we fix Φ= 0, and thus αˆp =αp(t)−α . Otherwise, let Φ=
c1
Bp
CR
(eαp(t)/4−1)−ρ−2ηNp, and αˆp =
αp(t)
2 , then αˆp =αp(t)−α .
Therefore, we can have |det(J f (b1|Dp))|
−1
|det(J f (b2|D′p))|−1 ≤ e
αp(t)−αˆp . From the
upper bounds stated in Assumption 1 and 3, the l2 norm of
the difference of ε1 and ε2 can be bounded as:
‖ ε ′p(t)− εp(t) ‖=
Bp
∑
i=1
‖ yipL ′(y′ip fp(t+1)T x′ip)x′ip
− (yipL ′(yip fp(t+1)T xip)xip ‖≤ 2.
Thus,‖ ε ′p(t) ‖ − ‖ εp(t) ‖≤‖ ε ′p(t)−εp(t) ‖≤ 2. Therefore, by
selecting ζp(t) =
αˆp
2 , we can bound the ratio of conditional
densities of fp(t +1) as
Q( fp(t+1)|Dp)
Q( fp(t+1)|D′p) ≤ e
αp(t), and prove that
the DVP can provide αp(t)-differential privacy.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: (Theorem 2)
Let Dp and D′p be two datasets with Hd(Dp,D′p) = 1.
Since only Vp(t) is released, then our target is to prove
Q(Vp(t+1)|Dp)
Q(Vp(t+1)|D′p) ≤ e
αp(t). From (19), we have: Q(Vp(t+1)|Dp)Q(Vp(t+1)|D′p) =
K (εp(t))
K (ε ′p(t))
= e
−ζp(t)‖εp(t)‖
e−ζp(t)‖ε
′p(t)‖ . Therefore, in order to make the model
to provide αp(t)-differential privacy, we need to find a ζp(t)
that satisfies
ζp(t)(‖ εp(t) ‖ − ‖ ε ′p(t) ‖)≤ αp(t). (32)
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Let V A = argminVp L
prim
p (t|Dp), and V B =
argminVp L
prim
p (t|D′p), where Lprim(t|D) is the augmented
Lagrange function for PVP given dataset D.
Let F , G be defined at each node p ∈ P
as: F(Vp(t)) = L
prim
p (t|Dp), and G(Vp(t)) =
Lprimp (t|D′p) − Lprimp (t|Dp), respectively. Thus,
G(Vp) = C
R
Bp ∑
Bp
i=1(L (y
′
ipV
T
p x
′
ip) − L (yipV Tp xip)). According
to Assumption 2, we can imply that Lprimp (t|Dp) = F(Vp(t))
and Lprimp (t|D′p) = F(Vp(t)) + G(Vp(t)) are both ρ-strong
convex. Differentating G(Vp(t)) with respect to Vp(t) gives:
∇G(Vp) =
CR
Bp
(y′ipL
′(y′ipV
T
p x
′
ip)x
′
ip− (yipL (yipV Tp xip)xip.
From Assumption 1 and 3, ‖∇G(Vp) ‖≤ 2CRBp . From definitions
of V A and V B, we have: ∇F(V A) = ∇F(V B)+∇F(V B) = 0.
From Lemma 14 in [18] and the fact that F(·) is ρ-
strongly convex, weh have the following inequality:
〈∇F(V A) − F(V B),V A − V B〉 ≥ ρ ‖ V A − V B ‖2; therefore,
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields:
‖V A−V B ‖ · ‖ ∇G(V B) ‖≥ (V A−V B)T∇G(V B)
= 〈∇F(V A)−F(V B),V A−V B〉 ≥ ρ ‖V A−V B ‖2 .
Dividing both sides by ρ ‖V A−V B ‖ gives:
‖V A−V B ‖≤ 1
ρ
‖ ∇G(V B) ‖≤ 2C
R
ρBp
. (33)
From (19), we have ‖ V A−V B ‖≤ 1ρ ‖ ∇G(V B) ‖=‖ εp(t)−
ε ′p(t) ‖ . Thus, we can bound
ζp(t)(‖ εp(t) ‖ − ‖ ε ′p(t) ‖)≤ ζp(t)(‖ εp(t)− ε ′p(t) ‖)≤
2CR
Bpρ
ζp(t)
Therefore, by choosing ζp(t) =
ρBpαp(t)
2CR , the inequality (32)
holds; thus PVP is dynamic αp-differential private at each
node p.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: (Theorem 3)
Let fˆp(t + 1) = argmin fp Zˆp( fp, t), and f
∗ =
argmin fp Zp( fp, t|Dp). Let f p(t + 1) be the actual
estimated optimum obtained using Algorithm 1. We
assume that f p(t + 1) is very close to the actually so that
Zp( f p(t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)→ 0. For the non-private ERM,
[18] and [19] show that for a specific reference classifier f 0
at time t+1 such that Cˆ( f 0) = Cˆ0, we have:
Cˆ( f p(t+1)) =Cˆ0 +
(
Zˆp( f p(t+1), t)− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)
)
+
(
Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)− Zˆp( f 0, t)
)
+
ρ
2
‖ f 0 ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ f p(t+1) ‖2 .
From Sridharan et al. [20], we have, with probability at least
1−δ
Zˆp( f p, t)− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)≤ 2
(
Zp( f p(t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)
)
+O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
.
Since Zp( f p(t + 1)|Dp) − Zp( f ∗|Dp) → 0, then,
Zˆp( f p(t+1), t)− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)≤ O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
. If we
choose ρ ≤ αacc‖ f 0‖2 , then,
ρ
2 ‖ f 0 ‖2 −ρ2 ‖ f p(t + 1) ‖2≤ αacc2 .
Thus, Cˆ( f p(t+1))≤Cˆ∗+O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
+
αacc
2
. Therefore,
we can find the value of Bp by solving O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
+ αacc2 ≤
αacc, we obtain: Bp > βnon max
(
CR‖ f 0‖2ln( 1δ )
α2acc
)
.
If we determine different reference classifier f 0p(t + 1) at
different time, then we need to find the maximum value across
the time and among different value of ‖ f 0 ‖:
Bp > βnon max
(
max
t
(CR ‖ f 0 ‖2 ln( 1δ )
α2acc
))
.
Let f nonp (t + 1) = argmin fp L
N
p (t). Since Cˆ( f
non
p (t + 1)) =
Cˆ( f p(t + 1)) + ∆non(t), then, Cˆ( f nonp (t + 1)) ≤ Cˆ0(t + 1) +
αacc+∆non(t), with probability no less than 1−δ .
APPENDIX D
In this appendix, we provide the proof of Theorem 4 with
the help of Lemma 7 and 8, which are also proved later.
Proof: (Theorem 4) First we define fˆp(t + 1) and f ∗
in the same way as in Appendix C. We also define f ∗p(t +
1) = argmin fp Z
dual
p ( fp, t|Dp), and Cˆ( f 0p(t)) = Cˆ0(t) at time t.
We use the analysis of [18] and [19] (also see the work of
Chaudhuri et al. in [3]), and have the following:
Cˆ( f ∗p (t+1)) =Cˆ0(t+1)+
(
Zˆp( f ∗p (t+1), t)− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)
)
+
(
Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)− Zˆp( f 0p (t+1), t)
)
+
ρ
2
‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 −
ρ
2
‖ f ∗p (t+1) ‖2 .
(34)
Now we bound each terms in the right hand side of (34) as
follows. From Assumption 1, we have L ′ ≤ c1. By choosing
Bp >
5c1CR‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2
αaccαp(t) , and ρ >
αacc
2‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 , and since αp(t)≤ 1,
we have:
αˆp =αp(t)− ln
(
1+
c1
Bp
CR
(
ρ+2ηNp
))2 > αp(t)− ln(1+ c1CRBpρ )2
>αp(t)− ln(1+ 2αp(t)5 )
2 > αp(t)− 4αp(t)5 =
αp(t)
5
.
Then, according to Algorithm 2, we choose the corresponding
ζp(t) =
αp(t)
4 because αˆp > 0. Let Λ be the event
Λ :=
{
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)≤ Zp( f ∗|Dp)+
16d2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρB2pαp(t)2
}
.
Since αˆp >
αp(t)
2 > 0, and applying Lemma 8 yields
Pεp(t)
(
Λ
)
≥ 1−δ . From the work of Sridharan et al. in [20],
the following inequality holds with probability 1−δ
Zˆp( f ∗p (t+1))− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1))
≤ 2
(
Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)
)
+O
( ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
≤
32d2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρB2pαp(t)2
+O
( ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
.
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The big-O notation hides the numerical constants, which
depend on the derivative of the loss function and the upper
bounds of the data points shown in Assumption 3. Combining
the above two processes, Zˆp( f ∗p(t + 1))− Zˆp( fˆp(t + 1)) is
bounded as shown above with probability 1−2δ .
From the definitions of f 0p(t + 1) and fˆp(t + 1), we obtain
Zˆp( fˆp(t + 1), t)− Zˆp( f 0p(t + 1), t) < 0. Since P ≥ 1, then by
selecting ρ = αacc‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 , we can bound
ρ
2 ‖ f 0p(t+1) ‖2 −ρ2 ‖
f ∗p(t+1) ‖2≤ αacc2 . Therefore, from (47), we have:
Cˆ( f ∗p (t+1))≤C0E +
32d2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρB2pαp(t)2
+O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
+
αacc
2
,
with ρ = 6αacc‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 . The lower bounds of Bp is determined
by solving the following:
32d2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρB2pαp(t)2
+O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
+
αacc
2
≤ αacc.
Lemma 7. Let Z be a gamma random variable with density
function Γ(k,θ), where k is an integer, and let δ > 0. Then,
we have:
P(Z < kθ ln(
k
δ
))≥ 1−δ .
Proof: (Lemma 7) Since Z is a gamma random variable
Γ(k,θ), then we can express Z as Z = ∑ki=1 Zi, where {Zi}ki=1
are independent exponential random variables with density
function Exp( 1θ ); thus, for each Zi we have: P(Zi≤ θ ln( kδ )) =
1− δk . Since {Zi}ki=1 are independent, we have:
P(Z < kθ ln(
k
δ
)) =
k
∏
i=1
P(Zi ≤ θ ln( kδ )) = (1−
δ
k
)k ≥ 1−δ .
Lemma 8. Let αˆp > 0, and f ∗p(t + 1) =
argmin fp Z
dual
p ( fp, t|Dp), and f ∗ = argmin fp Zp( fp|Dp).
Let Λ be the event
Λ :=
{
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)≤ Zp( f ∗|Dp)+
16d2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρB2pαp(t)2
}
.
Under Assumption 1 and 2, we have: Pεp(t)
(
Λ
)
≥ 1−δ . The
probability Pεp(t) is taken over the noise vector εp(t).
Proof: (Lemma 8) Since αˆp > 0, Φ = 0, f ∗p(t + 1) =
argmin fp Z
dual
p ( fp, t|Dp) can be expressed as: f ∗p(t + 1) =
argmin fp
(
Zp( fp|Dp)+2εp(t)T fp
)
. Thus, we have:
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)≤ Zp( f ∗|Dp)+
CR
Bp
εp(t)T ( f ∗− f ∗p(t+1)).
Firstly, we bound the l2-norm ‖ f ∗ − f ∗p(t + 1) ‖. We use
the similar procedure to establish (33) in Appendix C by
setting F(Y ) = Zp(Y |Dp) and G(Y ) = CRBp εp(t); thus, based on
Assumption 1 and 2, we have:
‖ f ∗− f ∗p(t+1) ‖≤
1
ρ
‖ ∇(2εp(t)T fp) ‖≤ CR ‖ εp(t) ‖Bpρ .
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields:
Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)≤‖ Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp) ‖
≤ 2
Bp
‖ εp(t)T ( f ∗− f ∗p (t+1) ‖≤
(
CR
)2 ‖ εp(t) ‖2
B2pρ
.
Since the noise vector εp(t) is drawn fromKp(ε)∼ e−ζp(t)‖ε‖,
then ‖ εp(t) ‖ is drawn from Γ(d, 1ζp(t) ) = Γ(d,
2
αˆp ). Then, by
using Lemma 7 with ‖ εp(t) ‖≤ 2d ln(
d
δ )
αˆp , we have:
Λ :=
{
Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)≤ Zp( f ∗|Dp)−
4d2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρB2pαp(t)2
.
with probability no less than 1−δ .
APPENDIX E
We prove Theorem 5 here. This appendix also shows
Lemma9 that are used in the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof: (Theorem 5) We define fˆp(t + 1) and f ∗ as in
the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix D, and we also define
f ∗p(t + 1) = argmin fp Z
prim
p ( fp, t|Dp). Let Cˆ( f 0p(t)) = Cˆ0(t) at
time t. As in Appendix D, we again use the analysis of [18]
and [19] (also see the work of Chaudhuri et al. in [3]), and
have the follows
Cˆ( f ∗p (t+1)) =Cˆ( f 0p (t+1))+
(
Zˆp( f ∗p (t+1), t)
−Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)
)
+
(
Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)− Zˆp( f 0p (t+1), t)
)
+
ρ
2
‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 −
ρ
2
‖ f ∗p (t+1) ‖2 .
(35)
According to Theorem 2, we choose ζp(t) =
ρBpαp(t)
2CR > 0.
Thus, applying Lemma 9, we have:
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)≤
16
(
CR
)2η2N2pd2( ln( dδ ))2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
,
with probability no smaller than 1−δ . Then, we use the result
of Sridharan et al. in [20], with probability no smaller than
1−δ :
Zˆp( f ∗p (t+1))− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1))≤ 2
(
Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)
−Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)
)
+O
( ln( dδ )
Bpρ
)
≤32
(
CR
)2η2N2pd2( ln( dδ ))2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
+O
( ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
.
Combining the above two processes, we have the probability
no smaller than 1−2δ .
In order to bound the last two terms in
(35), we select ρ = αacc‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 ; as a result,ρ
2
‖ f 0p(t+1) ‖2 −
ρ
2
‖ f ∗p(t+1) ‖2≤
αacc
2
. From the
definitions of fˆp(t + 1) and f 0p(t + 1), we have:
Zˆp( fˆp(t + 1), t) − Zˆp( f 0p(t + 1), t) ≤ 0. The value of Bp
is determined such that Cˆ( f ∗p(t + 1)) ≤ Cˆ∗+αacc. Therefore,
we find the bounds of Bp by solving
32
(
CR
)2η2N2pd2( ln( dδ ))2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
+O
(CR ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
+
αacc
2
≤ αacc,
with ρ = αacc‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 .
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The following Lemma is analogous to Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. Let ζp(t) > 0, and f ∗p(t + 1) =
argmin fp Z
prim
p ( fp, t|Dp), and f ∗ = argmin fp Zp( fp|Dp).
Suppose that the noise vector εt(t) generated at time t has
the same value of αp(t) for all p ∈P . Let Λ be the event
Λ :=
{
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)≤ Zp( f ∗|Dp)
+
16
(
CR
)2η2N2pd2( ln( dδ ))2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
}
.
If the loss function L is convex and differentiable with |L | ≤
1, then, we have: Pεp(t)
(
Λ
)
≥ 1−δ . The probability Pεp(t) is
taken over the noise vector εp(t).
Proof: (Lemma 9)
Let ε pi(t) = εp(t) − εi(t) with probability density Pε pi .
Let f ∗p(t + 1) = argmin fp Z
prim
p ( fp, t|Dp), and it can be ex-
pressed as: f ∗p(t+1) = argminfp
(
Zp( fp|Dp)−Yp
)
, where
Yp = η∑i∈Np
(
( fp− 12 ( fp(t)+ fi(t))T · (ε pi(t))+ 14
(
ε pi(t)
)2).
Thus, we have:
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)≤ Zp( f ∗|Dp)−η ∑
i∈Np
( f ∗− f ∗p(t+1))T · ε pi.
Firstly, we bound the l2-norm ‖ f ∗− f ∗p(t+1) ‖. We use the
similar procedure to establish (46) in Appendix D by setting
F(·) = Zp(·|Dp) and G(·) = η∑i∈Np
(
ε pi
)T
(·); thus, based on
Assumption 1 and 2, we have:
‖ f ∗− f ∗p (t+1) ‖≤
1
ρ
‖ ∑
i∈Np
∇(ηNp( f ∗p (t+1))T ε pi) ‖
≤ ∑
i∈Np
η ‖ ε pi(t) ‖
ρ
= ∑
i∈Np
η
(
‖ εp(t)− ε j(t) ‖
)
ρ
≤ ∑
i∈Np
η
(
‖ εp(t) ‖+ ‖ ε j(t) ‖
)
ρ
.
Since αp(t) is the same for all p ∈P at time t, ζ j(t) =
ρBpαp(t)
2CR for all j ∈P . Since ε j(t) is drawn from (15), then,
‖ εp(t) ‖∼ Γ(d, 1ζp(t) ) for all p ∈P . Let ‖ εpi ‖⊕=‖ εp(t) ‖
+ ‖ εi(t) ‖ . Thus,
‖ f ∗− f ∗p (t+1) ‖≤ ∑
i∈Np
η
(
‖ εpi ‖⊕
)
ρ
=
ηNp
(
‖ εpi ‖⊕
)
ρ
.
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields:
Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)
≤‖ Zp( f ∗p (t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp) ‖≤
η2N2p
(
‖ εpi ‖⊕
)2
ρ
,
From the fact that if {X j}Kj=1 are independent gamma
random variables with density Γ(β j,h), then X = ∑Kj=1 X j
is a gamma random variable with Γ(∑Kj β j,h), we have
P‖ε p j‖=Γ(2d,
2CR
ρBpαp(t) ). Applying Lemma 7 with ‖ ε p j(t) ‖⊕≤
4CRd ln( dδ )
ρBpαp(t) yields:
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)≤
16
(
CR
)2η2N2pd2( ln( dδ ))2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
with probability no smaller than 1−δ .
APPENDIX F
Theorem 6 is proved in this appendix based on Lemma 10.
Proof: (Theorem 6) We use fˆp(t+1), f ∗, and f ∗p(t+1),
defined in the proof of Theorem 5 in Appendix E. Now we use
a reference f 0p(t) such that Cˆ( f
∗
p(t)) = Cˆ
0(t) be the reference
at time t + 1. We use the analysis of [18] and [19] (also see
the work of Chaudhuri et al. in [3]), and have the follows,
Cˆ(V ∗p (t+1)) =Cˆ( f 0p (t+1))+
(
Zˆp(V ∗p (t+1), t)− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)
)
+
(
Zˆp( fˆp(t+1), t)− Zˆp( f 0p (t+1), t)
)
+
ρ
2
‖ f 0p (t+1) ‖2 −
ρ
2
‖V ∗p (t+1) ‖2 .
(36)
If R( fp(t)) = 12 ‖ fp(t) ‖2, then, ‖∇2R( fp(t)) ‖≤ 1. Thus, we
can apply Lemma 10 with τ = 1:
Zprimp (V
∗
p (t+1), t|Dp)−Zprimp ( f ∗p (t+1), t|Dp)
≤
4
(
CR
)2d2(ρ+ c4CR)( ln( dδ ))2
ρ2B2pαp(t)2
,
with probability ≥ 1− δ over the noise. In the proof of
Theorem 5, we have, with probability 1−δ ,
Zp( f ∗p(t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)≤
4η2N2pd2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
.
Therefore, with probability 1−2δ , we have
Zp(V ∗p (t+1)|Dp)−Zp( f ∗|Dp)
≤ 4η
2N2pd
2( ln( dδ ))2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
+
4d2
(
ρ+ c4
)(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρ2B2pαp(t)2
.
Sridharan et al. in [20] shows, with probability 1−δ ,
Zˆp(V ∗p (t+1))− Zˆp( fˆp(t+1))
≤ 2
(
Zprimp (Vp(t+1), t|Dp)−Zprimp ( f ∗p (t+1), t|Dp)
)
+O
(
CR
ln( dδ )
Bpρ
)
≤
8
(
CR
)2d2(ρ+ c4CR)( ln( dδ ))2
ρ2B2pαp(t)2
+
8η2N2pd2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
+O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
.
Combining the above two inequalities, we have the probability
no smaller than 1−3δ .
Since fˆp(t + 1) = argmin fp Zˆp( fp, t), then,
(
Zˆp( fˆp(t +
1), t)− Zˆp( f 0p(t +1), t)≤ 0. For the last two terms, we select
ρ = αacc‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 to make them bounded by
αacc
2 .
The value of Bp is determined by solving
8
(
CR
)2d2(ρ+ c4CR)( ln( dδ ))2
ρ2B2pαp(t)2
+
8η2N2pd2
(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρ3B2pαp(t)2
+O
(
CR
ln( 1δ )
Bpρ
)
+
αacc
2
= αacc,
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with ρ = αacc‖ f 0p (t+1)‖2 , such that P
(
Cˆ(V ∗p (t +1))≤ Cˆ0(t +1)+
αacc
) ≥ 1− 3δ . However, the accuracy of V ∗p (t + 1) depends
on f ∗p(t + 1), thus we also have to make P
(
Cˆ( f ∗p(t + 1)) ≤
Cˆ0(t+1)+αacc
)≥ 1−2δ . Combining the result of Theorem
5, we arrive at (26).
Lemma 10. Assume R( fp(t)) is doubly differentiable w.r.t.
fp(t) with ‖ ∇2R( fp(t)) ‖≤ τ for all fp(t). Suppose the loss
function L is differentiable, L ′ is continuous, and satisfies
|L ′(a)−L ′(b)| ≤ c4|a−b| for all pairs (a,b) with a constant
c4. Let f ∗p(t +1) = argmin fp Z
prim
p ( fp, t|Dp), and V ∗p (t +1) =
f ∗p(t +1)+ εp(t), where the noise vector εp(t) is drawn from
(15) with the same αp(t) for all p ∈P at time t. Let Λ be
the event
Λ :=
{
Zprimp (V
∗
p (t+1), t|Dp)≤ Zprimp ( f ∗p(t+1), t|Dp)+ψ
}
where ψ =
4
(
CR
)2
d2
(
ρτ+c4CR
)(
ln( dδ )
)2
ρ2B2pαp(t)2
. Under Assumption 1
and 2, we have: Pεp(t)
(
Λ
)
≥ 1−δ . The probability Pεp(t) is
taken over the noise vector εp(t).
Proof: (Lemma 10) From Assumption 3, we know that
the data points in dataset Dp satisfy: ‖ xip ‖≤ 1, and |yip|= 1.
From Assumption 1 and 2, R(·) and L are differentiable.
Suporse R(·) is doubly differentiable and ∇2R(·)≤ τ . Let 0≤
ϕ ≤ 1, then, the Mean Value Theorem and Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality give:
Zprimp (V
∗
p (t+1), t|Dp)−Zprimp ( f ∗p (t+1), t|Dp)
= (V ∗p (t+1)− f ∗p (t+1))T∇Zprimp
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)
+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
)
≤‖V ∗p (t+1)− f ∗p (t+1) ‖
· ‖ ∇Zprimp
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
)
‖ .
Let ε pi(t) = εp(t) − εi(t). From the definition of
Zprimp ( fp, t|Dp), we have:
Zprimp ( fp, t|Dp) = Zp( fp|Dp)
−η ∑
i∈Np
(
( fp− 12 ( fp(t)+ fi(t))
T · (ε pi(t))+ 1
4
(ε pi(t))2
)
.
Taking the derivative of Zprimp w.r.t. fp gives
∇Zprimp ( fp, t|Dp) =
CR
Bp
Bp
∑
i=1
yipL ′(yip f Tp xip)xip
+ρ∇R( fp)−η ∑
j∈Np
ε pi(t).
Since ∇Zprimp ( f ∗p(t+1), t|Dp) = 0, then, we have:
∇Zprimp
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)|Dp
)
= ∇Zprimp ( f
∗
p (t+1), t|Dp)−ρ
(
∇R( f ∗p (t+1))−∇R
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)
+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
))− CR
Bp
Bp
∑
i=1
(
yip
(
L ′(yip f ∗p (t+1)T xip)
−L ′(yip
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
)T xip))xip
)
.
Let T =yip
(
L ′(yip f ∗p(t+1)
T xip)
−L ′(yip
(
ϕ f ∗p(t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
)T xip))xip.
Based on the condition on the loss function: |L ′(a) −
L ′(b)| ≤ c4|a−b|, we can bound T as follows:
T ≤|yip| ‖ xip ‖
· |L ′(yip f ∗p (t+1)T xip)
−L ′(yip
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
)T xip)|
≤|yip| ‖ xip ‖ ·c4 · |yip(1−ϕ)( f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1))T xip|
≤c4 · (1−ϕ)|yip|2 ‖ xip ‖2‖ f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖
≤c4 · (1−ϕ) ‖ f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖ .
Since we assume R(·) is doubly differentiable, we then apply
the Mean Value Theorem:
‖ ∇R( f ∗p(t+1))−∇R
(
ϕ f ∗p(t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)
) ‖
≤ (1−ϕ) ‖ f ∗p(t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖ · ‖ ∇2R(ξ ) ‖,
where ξ ∈Rd . Therefore, we have
∇Zprimp
(
ϕ f ∗p (t+1)+(1−ϕ)V ∗p (t+1)|Dp
)
≤ (1−ϕ) ‖ f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖ ·ρ· ‖ ∇2R(ξ ) ‖
+CRc4 · (1−ϕ) ‖ f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖
≤ (1−ϕ)· ‖ f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖
(
ρτ+CRc4
)
≤‖ f ∗p (t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖
(
ρτ+CRc4
)
.
Since f ∗p(t+1)−V ∗p (t+1)= εp(t), with density Γ(d, 2C
R
ρBpαp(t) )
then, we can apply Lemma 10 to ‖ f ∗p(t + 1)−V ∗p (t + 1) ‖.
Thus, with ‖ f ∗p(t+1)−V ∗p (t+1) ‖≤
2CRd ln( dδ )
ρBpαp(t) , we have:
Zprimp (V
∗
p (t+1), t|Dp)−Zprimp ( f ∗p (t+1), t|Dp)
≤
4
(
CR
)2d2(ρτ+ c4CR)( ln( dδ ))2
ρ2B2pαp(t)2
,
with probability no less than 1−δ .
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